Gabriel Kahan and Daniel Seel have published a paper in the working paper series by Laboratoire interdisciplinaire d’évaluation des politiques publiques (LIEPP), which is hosted at Sciences Po in Paris. You can find the abstract below:
“A growing number of social scientists call for financial democracy as a “non-reformist reform,” yet scholarship still relies on disjointed case studies. In pursuit of greater conceptual and empirical rigor, this article offers a comparative analysis of financial democracy in two parts. First, we argue financial democracy can be operationalized by combining the relative volume of socialized investment with the governance structure of public financial institutions. Second, we illustrate this framework through a comparative analysis of existing institutions. Examining public asset managers in France (State Shareholding Agency), Singapore (Temasek), and China (SASAC), we demonstrate significant differences in the scale and character of shareholding aligned with public interests. Nevertheless, the cases converge toward a corporatist model in
which large institutions pursuing long-term sectoral planning are insulated from popular input. Our findings point to financial democracy as a measurable phenomenon that, at present, varies greatly across institutional context while sharing key characteristics. Much like the formal institutions of political democracy, the formal institutions of financial democracy have yet to
substantively incorporate the demos.”
You can find the paper in English here.